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This	essay	deals	with	 the	 ‘problem’	of	 the	wearing	of	headscarves	by	
Muslim	 schoolgirls	 in	 the	public	 space	 of	modern	France.	 In	March	
2004,	France’s	national	 legislature	passed	a	 law	prohibiting	pupils	 in	
public	 schools	 from	wearing	 symbols	 or	 attire	which	 conspicuously	
express	religious	affiliation.	 In	 this	essay,	 the	author	regards	the	three	
pivotal	factors	in	the	creation	of	this	‘problem’	as	secularism,	gender	and	
postcolonial	 social	 structure.	The	 first	 section	of	 this	essay	presents	a	
brief	account	of	the	concept	of	laïcité	(laicism/secularism)	in	France,	and	
this	is	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	meaning	of	wearing	the	headscarf	
from	the	perspective	of	the	categories	female/male.	
I. Laïcité as the Bedrock of Republican Democracy
	 The	 term	 laïcité	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	
(Buisson,	 2000).	 It	 is	 formed	 from	 the	French	adjective	 laïque,	 itself	
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deriving	 from	 the	Greek	 laos	meaning	 ‘the	 people’.	According	 to	
Littré’s	dictionary,	 the	adjective	 laïc	describes	 “one	who	 is	neither	a	
clergyman	nor	a	religious	person”.		In	the	latter	half	of	the	19th	century	
the	masculine	and	 feminine	 forms	of	 this	 adjective	 took	on	different	
meanings.	The	masculine	 form	laïc	came	to	describe	one	who	 is	not	a	
cleric	 (clerc),	 a	category	 including	acolytes	not	yet	ordained,	whereas	
the	 feminine	 form	 laïque	 came	 to	describe	 things	 “falling	under	 the	
category	 laïcité”	 	 (Conseil	d’État,	 2004).	Thus,	 in	 laïc	 an	opposition	 is	
set	up	between	the	clergy	and	the	 laity,	whereas	 in	the	 feminine	 form	
laïque,	 the	concept	of	an	 institutional	reality	separate	 from	the	Catholic	
Church	 inheres	 in	 the	 very	 definition	 of	 the	word—and	 of	 course	
the	new	reality	 expressed	here	by	 the	word	 laïcité	 is	precisely	 the	
institutional	 reality	of	 the	present	Republic.	However,	 the	 institutional	
practices	of	republicanism	were	not	established	without	conflict,	and	the	
social	context	regarding	the	implementation	of	laïcité has	evolved.	First,	
therefore,	we	must	briefly	summarize	the	historical	facts	of	the	matter.	
	 The	Great	Revolution	of	1789	saw	the	 ideals	of	Enlightenment	
philosophy	realized	even	 if	 large	areas	were	excluded	 (Conseil	d’État,	
2004).	The	Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,	 issued	
that	same	year,	declares	that	“No	one	shall	be	disquieted	on	account	of	
his	opinions,	 including	his	religious	views,	provided	their	manifestation	
does	not	disturb	the	public	order	established	by	law,”	(Article	X).	In	the	
field	of	education,	Condorcet	regarded	public	education	as	a	condition	for	
universal	emancipation,	and	considered	it	the	mission	of	public	education	
to	 lead	people	away	from	the	 ignorance	that	resulted	 in	the	tyrannical	
rule	by	monarchs	and	 religious	bodies,	 and	 to	 “spread	 reason	 to	 the	
people”	(Condorcet,	1994).	The	goal	was	a	parliament	made	up	of	people	
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chosen	by	the	populace,	where	debate	would	be	conducted	on	the	basis	
of	rational	values	and	true	knowledge,	and	furthermore,	the	education	of	
citizens	who	would	accept	the	exclusive	sovereignty	of	 this	parliament.	
Of	 course	 as	 is	well	 known,	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 these	 ideals,	 the	
Revolution	at	 its	height	paradoxically	gave	birth	to	a	number	of	 forms	
of	 religious	expression.	For	example,	 in	company	with	 the	Goddess	of	
Liberty,	the	Cult	of	Reason	was	celebrated	by	some	revolutionary	groups.	
Even	Robespierre,	who	criticized	the	atheistic	element	of	such	worship,	
proclaimed	the	existence	of	 the	 ‘Supreme	Being’,	while	 in	 the	Reign	of	
Terror	instigated	by	Robespierre,	the	traditional	religions	of	Catholicism,	
Protestantism	and	Judaism	saw	a	great	number	of	their	clergy	executed.
	 It	was	 in	 these	chaotic	 times	 that	Napoleon	Bonaparte	came	
to	power,	 and	agreed	a	concordat	with	Pope	Pius	VII.	This	 contract	
between	Church	and	State	did	not,	 however,	 restore	Catholicism	 to	
the	 status	 of	 national	 religion,	 only	going	 as	 far	 as	 to	 acknowledge	
that	Catholicism	was	 “the	religion	of	 the	majority	of	French	citizens”.	
The	system	established	by	the	concordat	was	 intended	to	stabilize	the	
situation	by	the	reorganization	of	religion	under	the	strict	control	of	the	
government,	and	while	the	system	inherited	the	idea	of	religious	freedom	
as	a	legacy	of	the	revolution,	 it	 incorporated	Catholicism,	Protestantism,	
Lutheranism,	Calvinism	and	Judaism—the	main	Churches	of	 the	time—
into	a	 system	of	 “officially	 recognized	religions”i.	As	 Jean	Rivero	and	
Hugues	Moutouh	point	out,	because	 the	state	bore	 the	cost	of	clerical	
salaries	and	other	expenses	of	 these	officially	recognized	religions,	 the	
system	effectively	placed	these	religions	 in	a	position	of	public	service	
(Rivero	&	Moutouh,	 2003).	As	a	 result	 of	 this	partial	 formalization	of	
religious	pluralism,	France	entered—to	borrow	Rivero’s	expression—the	
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‘first	epoch’	of	 laicization.	 	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	Napoleon	maintained	
the	secular	nature	of	 the	 family	 law	 through	his	promulgation	of	 the	
civil	 code,	and	also	paved	 the	way	 for	hospitals	and	schools,	 two	key	
institutions,	 to	 achieve	 a	degree	 of	 independence	 from	 the	Catholic	
Church	(Baubérot,	2000).	
	 The	 concordat	 system	remained	 in	place	until	 1905,	 though	
not	without	challenge.	The	Restoration	 (1814-30)	attempted	to	reinvest	
Catholicism	with	 the	 character	 of	 state	 religion	 (without,	 however,	
abandoning	 the	 traditional	 idea	 of	 Gallicanism)ii.	 In	 contrast,	 by	
proclaiming	 in	 the	Charter	of	1830	 that	Catholicism	was	 "the	religion	
professed	by	the	majority	of	 the	French,"	 the	July	Monarchy	reversed	
the	Restoration's	 supportive	 stance	 towards	 ecclesiastical	 authority.	
According	 to	 the	historian	Minoru	Tanigawa,	 the	Catholic	Church,	
politically	 sidelined	by	 the	 liberalist	 policies	 of	 the	 July	Monarchy,	
viewed	these	policies	as	a	clear	sign	of	 the	 'money-driven	self-interest'	
of	 the	 'bourgeois'	monarchy,	and	an	attitude	of	mutual	suspicion	arose	
between	the	Catholic	Church	and	governmental	authorities	 (Tanigawa,	
1997).	Relations	between	the	two	parties	did	improve	during	the	Second	
Republic	 and	 the	Second	Empire	under	Napolean	 III	 (at	 least	before	
his	position	became	more	 liberal	 in	 the	 latter	half	 of	his	 reign).	The	
relationship	between	the	Church	and	government	was	also	close	at	the	
beginning	of	the	Third	Republic.
	 The	period	from	1880	onward	saw	a	deepening	of	the	conflict—
commonly	known	as	 the	 ‘war	of	 two	France’—between	Catholics	and	
anti-clerical	Republicans.	After	France’s	defeat	 in	 the	Franco-Prussian	
war,	 the	current	of	 ‘militant	anticlericalism’	had	been	strengthened	by	
the	popular	myth	 that	 “the	war	was	won	by	Prussian	primary	school	
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teachers	 [i.e.	 education]”.	This	militant	anticlericalism	not	only	aimed	
at	putting	an	end	 to	 the	Catholic	Church’s	 involvement	 in	public	 life,	
but	 also	 at	weakening	 its	 influence	 throughout	 the	whole	 of	 society.	
The	main	anticlerical	policies	 of	 this	period	 included	abolition	of	 the	
obligation	to	refrain	 from	working	on	the	Sabbath	 (1880),	 secularization	
of	hospitals	and	cemeteries,	restoration	of	divorce	(1884),	the	requirement	
for	monastic	orders	 to	obtain	governmental	authorization	 (or	be	closed	
down	 if	 they	 failed	 to	comply)	 (1880).	 In	 this	atmosphere	of	 tension	a	
series	 of	 education	 laws	were	also	 adopted.	Laws	 relating	 to	 female	
education	provided	 for	the	establishment	of	 teacher	training	colleges	 in	
each	départment	for	educating	female	primary	school	teachers	(1879),	and	
the	establishment	of	secondary	schools	for	girls	(1880).	Subsequently	the	
laws	of	1881-2	proposed	by	Jules	Ferry,	Minister	of	Public	 Instruction,	
established	 that	public	primary	education	should	be	 “mandatory,	 free	
of	charge	and	 laic”.	The	1882	Ferry	Law	stipulated	that	“if	 the	parents	
so	wish,	 a	 child	may	 receive	 religious	 education	 outside	 of	 school”;	
however,	 this	 effectively	banished	 religious	 instruction	 from	public	
primary	education.	Then	in	1886,	the	Goblet	law	laicized	school	personell	
and	 prohibited	 regional	 authorities	 from	 financing	 private	 schools,	
ensuring	that	 they	would	 fulfil	 their	obligation	to	maintain	at	 least	one	
public	school.	This	represented	a	considerable	withdrawal	of	the	control	
exercised	by	the	Church	on	public	primary	education	under	the	Guizot	
law	 (1833)	and	Falloux	 law	 (1850).	 It	 should,	however,	be	remembered	
that	 this	 laicization	of	schools	 took	place	within	the	existing	system	of	
officially	recognized	religions	(Baubérot,	2000).	
	 The	final	break	with	the	concordat	system	and	entry	 into	 the	
‘second	epoch’	(Rivero)	of	French	laïcité	came	with	the	so-called	1905	law.	
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This	 law	aimed	to	reconcile	 the	 ‘two	France’	by	guaranteeing	 freedom	
of	 religious	worship	and	giving	consideration	 to	 the	practical	 realities	
of	 laicization.	The	 solution	was	 to	 institutionalize	 the	 separation	 of	
Church	and	State.	Article	II	of	the	law	states	that	the	Republic	“neither	
recognizes,	nor	salaries,	nor	subsidizes	any	religion.”	This	announced	the	
end	of	the	system	of	offical	recognition	for	religions,	and	the	Church	now	
became	subject	 to	private	 law	 (the	1905	 law	did,	however,	 leave	open	
a	route	 for	payment	of	expenses	relating	to	chaplains	and	maintenance	
and	repair	of	church	buildings).	The	logic	of	laïcité	would	gradually	take	
hold	as	France	moved	through	the	twentieth	century,	notwithstanding	
a	brief	period	during	WWII	when	the	Nazi	puppet	regime	 installed	at	
Vichy	altered	the	spirit	of	 the	1905	 law	by	allowing	religious	education	
during	school	hours	and	financing	Catholic	schools.	The	two	constitutions	
adopted	after	WWII	finally	brought		an	end	to	the	‘two	France’	conflict	
by	enshrining	 the	concept	of	 laïcité	as	 the	 foundation	of	 the	Republic.	
The	constitutions	of	the	Fourth	and	Fifth	Republics	assert	that	«France	
shall	be	an	 indivisible,	 secular,	democratic	and	social	Republic».	From	
here	on	laïcité	became	an	principle	of	French	republicanism.
	 We	shall	now	focus	on	two	points	which	emerge	from	this	brief	
history	of	laïcité’s	establishment.
	 (1) The concept of laïcité has gained broad consensus in 
contemporary French societyiii.	 If	 laïcité	 has	gained	 consensus,	 it	 is	
because	it	has	developed	through	the	history	of	French	republicanism	to	
become	established	in	a	single	legal	framework.	This	does	not	necessarily	
mean	that	the	term	 ‘laïcité’	has	escaped	ambiguity	 in	 its	usage.	On	the	
contrary,	 it	 could	even	be	 said	 that	 this	 consensus	originates	 in	 the	
power	of	 the	concept	 laïcité	 to	embrace	mutually	contradictory	needs.	
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Emile	Poulat,	a	scholar	of	laïcité,	claims	that	French-style	laïcité	has	two	
sides,	“like	the	two	faces	of	the	Roman	god	Janus”	(Poulat,	2004).	We	will	
briefly	consider	what	those	two	sides	are.	On one side, laïcité bears the 
face of Gallicanism—the	principle	of	independence	of	the	French	Church.	
When	comparing	French	laïcité	with	systems	of	church-state	separation	
adopted	by	other	countries	 it	 is	difficult	 to	deny	the	anti-ecclesiastical	
aspect	of	France’s	 ‘nationalization’	of	the	Catholic	Church	(at	least	while	
the	French	conception	of	laïcité	remained	in	the	‘first	epoch’).	In	addition,	
the	fact	that	the	secular	authorities	in	post-revolutionary	France	always	
encountered	conflict	with	the	Vatican	whenever	issuing	important	policy	
relating	to	laïcité	indicates	that	the	point	at	issue	was	nothing	other	than	
the	exercise	of	national	sovereignty	(these	conflicts	belong	to	the	history	
of	diplomacy)iv.	 In	 its	other	aspect,	 it	could	also	be	said	that	 for a long 
time, the establishment of laïcité was synonymous with the advance of 
the practice of republican democracy.	This	extends	 from	the	removal	
of	the	Catholic	Church’s	influence	on	society,	through	political	liberalism	
loaded	with	the	concept	of	separation	of	Church	and	State,	and	reaches	
as	far	as	the	scientific	secularization	of	the	contents	of	school	textbooks.	
The	1905	 law,	 in	providing	a	 framework	for	religious	pluralism	without	
institutionalizing	 the	officially	recognized	religions,	made	a	break	with	
the	principle	of	 royal	power	as	part	of	France’s	political	 tradition.	Of	
course	when	one	hears	 the	words	of	people	almost	 fundamentalist	 in	
their	support	of	modern	 laïcité	 it	 is	hard	to	escape	the	 impression	that	
some	ambivalence	towards	this	break	with	the	past	still	remains.v
	 (2) The presence of the Islamic headscarf in the public space of 
modern France presents a challenge to the broad ‘republican’ consensus 
over laïcité, and as such casts light on what, in the historical structures 
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that created this consensus, has remained ‘still unconsidered’.	As	
the	 foregoing	examination	of	 the	 subject	 shows,	 the	notion	of	 laïcité	
has	been	a	key	element	 in	 the	democratic	 legitimacy	of	 the	French	
Republic.	However,	because	of	this	foundational	role,	it	is	essential	not	to	
lose	sight	of	 the	 formal	nature	of	 the	principle	of	separation	of	Church	
and	State.	That	 is	 to	 say,	 this	principle	has	 legitimacy	because	 it	has	
been	 formally	established.	The	public	 space	where	citizens	encounter	
one	another	 is	 constituted	on	 the	precondition	 that	 each	 individual’s	
religious	beliefs	remain	private	 (this	should	also	be	the	precondition	 for	
universal	realization	of	laïcité	as	a	legal	principle	at	least	in	the	national	
space	 (cf.	Althusser,	 2005)).	However	 in	 the	 reality	of	history,	 such	a	
republican	 ideal	has	only	ever	been	realized	 in	 forms	which	also	entail	
large	areas	of	exclusion.	 In	 its	report	 “Islam	 in	the	Republic”,	 the	High	
Council	on	Integration,	set	up	by	the	French	government	in	2002,	notes	
three	main	areas	where	 laïcité	 is	enforced	 inconsistently	 (Haut	Conseil	
à	 l’Intégration,	 2000).	These	 are	 (a)	 ownership	 and	administration	 of	
property	(religious	facilities)vi,	(b)	exclusion	of	a	number	of	French	regions	
from	 laïcité’s	 scope	of	applicationvii,	 and	 (c)	 the	 fact	 that	 the	1905	 law	
was	not	 implemented	 in	 former	départments	 in	Algeria.	 In	considering	
these	areas	of	exclusion,	we	 intend	 to	 focus	here	on	 the	dimension	of	
post-colonialism,	which	 is	 illuminated	 in	particular	by	 these	 last	 two	
areas.	For	it	is	precisely	this	dimension	which	can	indicate	those	things	
«as	yet	unthought»	 in	 the	historical	process	of	 laicization.	Our	 task	 is	
thus	to	analyze	the	“dissonance	 in	 laïcité”	 (Balibar,	2004)	struck	by	the	
appearance	of	 the	Muslim	schoolgirl’s	headscarf	 in	 the	public	space	of	
modern	France.
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II. Questions surrounding the connections between gender and 
postcolonial aspects of the headscarf problem.
In	 this	section	we	 focus	on	two	series	of	questions.	Firstly,	what	does	
the	 ‘headscarf’	 signify?	 In	particular	we	examine	 the	opinions	on	 the	
headscarf	problem	held	by	 feminists	 in	mutually	opposing	camps.	On	
one	side	are	 feminists	such	as	Elisabeth	Badinter	who	see	 the	root	of	
this	problem	as	 lying	with	 the	hijab	 as	 a	means	 of	propagating	 the	
marginalization	of	women,	and	who	criticize	 the	 liberals’	 call	 for	 ‘open	
laïcité’	and	tolerance	towards	the	wearing	of	the	hijab	in	public	schools—
what	they	see	as	the	 ‘Munich	of	Republican	schools’,	a	reference	to	the	
Munich	agreement	and	 the	 ill-advised	appeasing	stance	of	 the	 liberal	
camp	towards	the	spread	of	 fascism	(Badinter,	1986).	On	the	other	side	
are	the	feminists	who	differ	from	the	other	camp	in	acknowledging	the	
unfairness	 inherent	 in	 stigmatizing	a	particular	group.	The	constant	
reporting	of	the	headscarf	‘problem’	in	the	media	has	in	fact	resulted	in	
more	stigmatization	of	Muslim	girls	than	youths	in	general	(the	report	by	
the	High	Council	on	Integration	points	out	that	the	growth	of	a	beard―
or	at	least	the	beginnings	of	one―by	adolescent	Muslim	boys	who	wish	
to	be	recognized	as	Muslims	has	presented	virtually	no	problems	in	the	
running	of	schools	(Haut	Conseil	à	l’Intégration,	2000)).	The	second	series	
of	questions	centers	around	the	meaning	of	‘dysfunction	of	schools’.	In	the	
discourse	of	republican	ideals,	public	education	was	applauded	as	a	way	
of	elevating	the	working	class,	and	in	schools	the	ideal	of	egalitarianism	
and	appeals	 for	 laïcité	became	 intertwined.	 In	 reality,	however,	 over	
30	years	ago	a	group	of	 sociologists	began	analyzing	how	 inequalities	
are	structurally	reproduced	 in	France’s	education	system	 (Bourdieu	&	
Passeron,	1991).	It	seems	that	the	‘dysfunction’	in	France’s	public	schools	
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did	not	arise	piecemeal	and	through	chance	but	 is	 in	fact	a	phenomena	
determined	by	 the	history	 of	 class	 and	postcolonial	 immigration	 in	
France.	The	 law	passed	 on	March	 15,	 2004	 reflected	 the	 dilemma	
directly	 facing	the	Republican	school	against	this	historical	background.	
The	dilemma	 is	 that	while	 the	school	built	on	republican	principles	 is	
charged	with	the	mission	of	bringing	equality	to	all	members	of	society	
through	the	 light	of	knowledge,	since	 the	principle	of	 laïcité	has	come	
to	be	considered	as	the	precondition	for	fulfilling	this	mission,	any	pupil	
who	violates	this	principle,	even	if	they	are	from	a	disadvantaged	social	
class,	must	be	subject	to	series	of	sanctions	that	culminate	 in	expulsion	
from	the	educational	system.	One	of	the	decisive	factors	in	the	adoption	
of	the	2004	law	was	the	call	primarily	from	schools	for	nationally	unified	
standards	 in	place	of	 the	previous	policy	of	 leaving	 the	discipline	of	
pupils	to	the	discretion	of	each	school,	and	this	indicates	that	even	in	the	
schools	themselves	there	was	an	awareness	of	the	dilemmaviii.		
a. The meaning of the ‘headscarf’: questions of gender
	 From	the	moment	 the	pupil	exits	 the	public	school	gates,	 the	
wearing	of	 religious	symbols	ceases	 to	be	a	violation	of	 the	 law—in	a	
nation	based	on	laïcité	this	legal	reality	does	nothing	to	explain	why	the	
debate	 in	France	 tends	 to	 include	 the	wearing	of	headscarves	outside	
school.	 In	attempting	 to	understand	this	 tendency,	 it	 is	appropriate	 to	
study	 the	problem	 from	 the	perspective	of	gender	 (Rochefort,	 2005),	
and	 in	this	regard	the	 feminist	arguments	are	of	great	 interest,	 for	the	
feminist	debate	 forces	us	 to	consider	 the	social	 function	of	clothing,	of	
the	headscarf	 itself.	 In	 fact	one	of	 the	points	which	divides	 feminists	
is	whether	 the	headscarf	 is	 a	means	 of	 oppression	 or	 emancipation.	
Feminists	on	both	sides	seem	to	argue	this	point	from	the	standpoint	of	
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two	sets	of	historical	circumstances.	On	the	one	hand,	if modern feminism 
was established by liberating women from the Judao-Christian yoke, 
this inevitably gives the headscarf a prepackaged negative meaning	
ix.	As	Françoise	Gaspard	and	Farhad	Khosrokhavar	point	out,	 “even	 in	
France,	until	 only	 recently	 the	Catholic	Church	compelled	women	 to	
cover	their	hair	and	legs	when	going	out	into	the	town,	under	the	gaze	
of	men	outside	 the	 family,	while	 even	now	 the	wife	 of	 an	Orthodox	
Jew	must	shave	her	head	and	wear	a	wig”	 (Gaspard	&	Khosrokhavar,	
1995).	These	 facts	would	appear	to	 lead	to	two	conclusions.	Firstly,	 the	
headscarf	is	imbued	with	values	which	the	majority	in	France	today	find	
indefensible:	the	wearing	of	a	headscarf	by	a	secular	woman	for	religious	
reasons	 is	 seen	as	nothing	but	 the	 legacy	of	an	oppressive	past.	The	
second	conclusion	 is	 that	 for	 the	non-Muslim	majority,	 the	 traditional	
image	of	 the	Judaeo-Christian	headscarf	has	come	to	be	projected	onto	
the	Muslim	woman’s	hijab.	This	 is	quite	 frankly	a	 form	of	orientalism	;	
however,	such	projection	goes	 further	than	the	cultural	 level,	 its	 traces	
can	even	be	seen	in	the	government’s	policies	on	religious	administration.	
For	example,	 in	response	to	 the	problems	 in	the	metropolitan	suburbs,	
the	French	Government	 attempted	 to	 engage	 in	dialogue	by	giving	
representation	to	moderate	muslims	through	organization	 from	the	top	
down,	but	 it	has	often	been	pointed	out	 that	 in	doing	 this,	 the	 image	
of	 the	old	relationship	between	the	Catholic	hierarchy	and	the	secular	
authorities	 is	being	projected	onto	 the	 idea	of	giving	representation	to	
‘Islam	in	France’	as	the	partner	in	dialogue	(the	clerical	hierarchy	as	in	
Catholicism	does	not	traditionally	exist	 in	Islam)x.	On the other hand, in 
media discourse, presentation of the headscarf issue emphasizes images 
taken from Islamic fundamentalism or the latest geopolitical conflicts in 
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the Muslim world, as well as images from the perspective of ‘modern’ 
feminism in the sense outlined above.	On	this	point,	Florence	Rochefort	
describes	 this	 sort	 of	 amplified	 signification	 through	her	 analysis	 of	
the	media’s	handling	of	 the	 first	headscarf	 incident	 in	autumn	1989xi.	
Rochefort	writes,	«The	disturbance	caused	by	this	controversy	[…]	was	
stirred	up	even	more	by	 the	 treatment	of	 the	 incident	on	 the	screen.	
The	war	of	diction—the	‘chador	of	discord’	was	opposed	by	the	moderate	
expressions	 ‘veil’,	 ‘hijab’,	 the	more	reserved	 ‘headscarf’	 and	 the	 irony-
laden	 ‘fabric’	 [tissu]—went	together	with	the	war	of	 images.	As	well	as	
the	photographs	of	 the	young	girls	 themselves,	 the	 image	used	almost	
systematically	 to	depict	 this	 incident	was	 the	photograph	of	women	
walking	at	 the	 front	of	a	demonstration	by	fundamentalists	on	October	
22nd,	 like	a	vengeful	mass	dressed	 in	 long	headscarves	and	chadors.	
[…]	the	young	women	dressed	in	headscarves	were	seen	at	that	time	as	
a	pure	embodiment	of	 the	 threat	of	 Islamists	of	 the	 Iranian	revolution	
and	Arab/Muslim	countries.»	 (Rochefort,	2002).	The	view	of	 the	 female	
body	oppressed	by	Judaeo-Christian	rules,	as	described	above,	was	now	
supplemented	with	the	image	of	aggressive	Islamism	embodied	in	these	
chador-clad	women,	and	this	overlaying	of	negative	images	strengthened	
the	 argument	 against	wearing	headscarves.	However,	 the	battle	 of	
words	and	images	has	provided	scope	for	reflection	and	debate	over	the	
significations	generated	by	the	media	with	regard	to	the	headscarf	issue	
(with	essentialist	arguments	over	the	function	of	the	headscarf	taking	on	
a	relativist	 tone	among	the	media	and	academics)	and	also	 for	political	
intervention.	
b. The meaning of ‘dysfunction’ of the public : questions surrounding 
postcolonial social structure
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	 We	stated	earlier	that	dysfunction	in	public	schools	has	been	the	
subject	of	sociological	 research	 for	over	 thirty	years.	This	dysfunction	
is	 thus	 not	 an	 isolated	phenomena	but	 is	 located	 in	 the	 context	 of	
dysfunction	 in	 social	 cohesion	at	a	more	global	 level.	The	wearing	of	
headscarves	also	occupies	an	ambiguous	position	in	this	context.	Certainly	
it	 is	 often	 interpreted	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 socio-economic	 problems	 being	
expressed	 in	an	ethno-religious	 form,	 and	such	an	 interpretation	has	
led	to	anxiety	in	France	concerning	the	closed	nature	of	ethno-religious	
communities.	The	lack	of	knowledge	on	the	part	of	the	majority	and	the	
projection	of	cultural	traditions	close	to	the	self	have	resulted	in	a	sense	
of	crisis	throughout	French	society.	Yet	regardless	of	all	these	negative	
characterizations	surrounding	the	wearing	of	 the	headscarf,	 it	 remains	
a	 fact	 that	 a	minority	 of	Muslim	 schoolgirls	 seek	 the	 right	 to	wear	
the	headscarf.	Their	arguments	cannot	be	comprehensively	examined	
here,	but	there	are	two	points	 in	particular	the	author	wishes	to	make.	
Firstly, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to consider the unique 
situation of each country with regard to this problem.	The	wearing	of	
headscarves	by	Muslim	females	in	France	bears	the	distinctive	features	
of	being	a	marked	practice	as	a	result	of	the	laicization	of	public	space,	
and	of	having	been	practiced	 in	 former	French	coloniesxii.	However,	
these	distinctive	 features	by	no	means	make	France	 a	unique	 case.	
Having	noted	these	features	it	is	instructive	to	make	a	comparison	with	
a	country	such	as	Turkey.	The	regime	established	by	Mustafa	Kemal	
Atatürk	in	1923	was	authoritarian	and	promoted	modernization,	but	was	
also	characterized	by	policies	that	promoted	secularism:	policies	including	
prohibition	of	wearing	headscarves	 in	 the	public	sphere	 (1924),	mixed-
sex	education	 (1924),	abolition	of	sharia	 law	 (1926),	and	the	 introduction	
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of	women’s	right	 to	vote	and	stand	 for	office	 (1934).	A	point	 forcefully	
made	by	the	sociologist	Nilufer	Göle	 is	 that	under	Turkey’s	republican,	
secular	system	there	are	in	fact	still	“educated	[women]	from	the	lower	
and	middle	 classes”	 calling	 for	 the	 right	 to	wear	 the	headscarf.	Göle	
states	 that,	 “paradoxically,	 these	headscarf-wearing	 female	 students,	
who	owe	 their	 social	 position	 and	newly	acquired	 social	 recognition	
to	having	had	 access	 to	 secular	 education,	 are	 further	 empowering	
themselves	by	gaining	knowledge	of	 Islam	and	seeking	political	rights”	
(Göle,	 2000).	 In	Turkey’s	 case	 this	demand	 for	 rights	exists	against	a	
background	of	authoritarian	rule	by	military	authorities,	 a	new	move	
towards	democratization	through	economic	development,	and	the	birth	
of	a	moderate	Islamist	administration.	While	being	careful	not	to	confuse	
the	different	situations	of	these	two	countries,	we	would	suggest	that	in	
both	countries—countries	whose	national	 legitimacy	derives	 from	their	
secular	and	modernizing	character—wearing	the	headscarf	can	take	on	
an	‘oppositional’	value	that	criticises	the	present	dysfunctional	status	quo.
	 This	takes	us	to	the	second	point,	namely	that	it	is	necessary	to	
unpick	the	various	functions	of	the	headscarf.	The	hijab,	which	conceals	
part	of	 the	 individual’s	body,	simultaneously	 invokes	assumptions	about	
the	 individual’s	 social	 status	 (Muslim,	 female,	Arab,	etc.).	 	Feminists	 in	
opposing	camps	are	equally	 cautious	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 symbolic	
aspects	of	the	headscarf’s	visibility.	For	example,	Iranian-born	Chahdortt	
Djavann,	a	writer	critical	of	 Islam’s	oppressive	character,	also	criticizes	
headscarf-wearing	women—what	 she	 calls	 ‘seamstress’—on	grounds	
of	 the	paradoxical	 inversion	of	 the	headscarf’s	visual	 function.	Djavann	
writes,	 “the	wearing	 of	 the	headscarf	 in	France	 is	 not	 a	means	 for	
melting	anonymously	 into	 the	multitude,	but	 rather	 for	drawing	 the	
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gaze;	it	is	a	means	for	attracting	attention	to	the	self,	and	is	thus	a	form	
of	exhibitionism	or	provocation.	The	 female	 transforms	herself	 into	an	
objet,	and	thereby	shows	herself	off;	more	precisely,	she	is	the	women	as	
sexual	object”	 (Djavann,	2003).	The	problem	of	 the	headscarf’s	visibility	
thus	 intersects	with	the	problem	of	 the	objectification	of	 the	body.	Yet	
this	 sort	 of	 language	also	 invites	 the	 counter-question	who	 (or	more	
precisely	what	 type	of	woman	–	whether	 they	wear	 the	headscarf	or	
not	–	and	what	type	of	man)	can	possibly	escape	the	logic	of	this	form	of	
objectification	of	 the	body	 (and	moreover	 the	 logic	of	commodification)	
in	 the	capitalist	 society	we	 inhabit.	Perhaps	 this	 is	 the	site	where	 the	
issue	of	gender	raised	earlier	merges	with	the	issue	of	postcolonial	social	
structure.	One	may	simply	use	the	word	inequality,	but	there	are	in	fact	
inequalities	of	varying	character.	The	testimony	quoted	below	represents	
a	position	diametrically	opposed	to	that	of	Djavann.	In	an	interview	by	a	
female	journalist	from	the	French	newspaper	L’Humanité	with	Nouria,	a	
former	pupil	of	Faidherbe	High	School,	Lille,	who	was	suspended	in	1994	
for	wearing	a	headscarf,	Nouria	gives	her	views	on	the	disadvantaged	
situation	Muslim	schoolgirls	who	wear	headscarves	are	placed	in.	“Some	
people	may	 think	 it’s	wearing	 a	headscarf	 that	 ‘inferiorizes’	 us,	 but	
that’s	not	 the	only	thing”	 (Gathié,	1999).	While	 this	answer	might	seem	
perverse,	 it	also	shows	that	 the	calculation	 is	not	simple	 -	 it involves a 
careful weighing up of a two-fold inequality	(the	inequality	between	male	
and	 female,	 and	between	 the	 ‘immigrant’	population	and	 the	 ‘original	
French’	population)		and the advantages brought about by taking a position 
with regard to identity	(what	is	seen	as	necessary	to	oneself	in	the	midst	
of	this	two-fold	inequality).	On	this	point,	Christine	Delphy	writes	that	the	
Muslim’s	headscarf	has	problematized	“what	passes	as	sexual	 liberation	
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for	us”.	According	 to	Delphy,	 some	among	 the	Muslim	women	who	
wish	to	wear	the	headscarf	are	in	fact	seeking	refuge	from	the	present	
manifestation	of	patriarchal	authority	which	gives	the	illusion	of	equality.	
Delphy	goes	on	to	argue	that	there	is	a	mirror-image	symmetry	between	
the	religious	 fundamentalism	which	has	oppressed	women	by	 forcing	
them	 to	 cover	 their	bodies,	 and	 secularized	 capitalism	 that	 exploits	
women	by	undressing	the	body.	Delphy	writes,	 “every	women	 is	duty	
bound	to	an	existence	which	 ‘arouses	desire’	at	each	moment.	Women	
who	wear	the	headscarf	violate	this	injunction.	As	Samira	Bellil	pointed	
out	several	months	before	her	deathxiii,	the	obsession	of	people	who	wish	
to	cover	us	with	the	headscarf	finds	its	equivalent	only	in	the	obsession	
of	 those	other	people	who	wish	to	undress	us.	 Interestingly,	 these	two	
obsessions	are	 two	 forms	 [depicting	a	 symmetry]	of	 the	denial	 of	 the	
female	as	if	reflected	in	a	mirror.	On	one	side,	the	arousal	of	desire	by	the	
female	is	always	desired,	while	on	the	other	side	it	is	forbidden.	However,	
in	both	cases,	 the	reference	point	 that	must	be	considered	relative	 to	
the	woman’s	own	body	 is	male	desire.	What	the	headscarf	makes	clear	
is	 that	 the	woman’s	body	 is	not	 the	body	of	oneself	but	 is	 in	 fact	 the	
[objectified]	body	 for	oneself”	 (Delphy,	2005).	 It	 is	presumably	possible	
to	doubt	this	symmetry	between	religious	 fundamentalism	and	modern	
capitalism.	However,	if	Delphy	asserts	the	existence	of	this	symmetry,	it	
is	because	she	has	seen	that	this	symmetry	has	conditioned	a	new	form	
of	female	solidarity	in	spite	of	the	postcolonial	dividing	line	separating	off	
women	belonging	to	different	social	categories.
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Conclusion: views of the ‘headscarf issue’ from abroad
For	an	academic	scholar	observing	a	society	 from	abroad,	 there	are	at	
least	two	potential	 traps.	The	first	trap	 is	one	peculiar	to	Area Studies,	
namely	 that	being	 in	 the	position	of	a	 foreign	observer,	 the	scholar	 is	
prone	to	assimilate	the	history	of	the	whole	country	as	a	single	narrative	
viewed	 from	her	 own	perspective.	 In	 the	 first	half	 of	 this	 essay	 for	
example,	an	particular	interest	in	the	story	of	the	development	of	laïcité	
in	France	has	perhaps	led	us	to	underestimate	determining	factors	other	
than	 the	conflict	between	 the	Republic	and	 the	Catholic	Church.	This	
attitude	carries	 the	risk	of	 ‘fundamentalist	 laïcité’,	 of	blindly	enforcing	
the	 ideals	of	 laïcité	 in	a	multicultural	society	 like	France	today	 (it	 is	 to	
say	 that	 this	 risk	 is	not	 limited	 to	 foreign	scholars	 (Bancel,	Blanchard	
&	Vergès,	2003;	Weil	&	Dufois,	2005)).	The	other	trap	 is	peculiar	to	the	
Cultural Studies	 scholar.	For	scholars	 trained	 in	 the	methodologies	of	
cultural	studies—not	uncommon	 in	universities	 in	 the	English-speaking	
world—it	 is,	 if	 anything,	 easy	 to	 recognize,	within	 the	discourse	 of	
fundamentalist	 laïcité	used	by	some	French,	a	 form	of	historical	denial	
in	 the	post-colonial	 period.	And	 it	 is	 only	 a	 small	 step	 from	here	 to	
the	weaving	of	narratives	concerning	 the	 latent	political	 and	cultural	
power	 of	 the	 diaspora	 brought	 about	 by	 colonialization.	However,	
schematic	diagrams	 from	 the	 cultural	 studies	handbook,	unless	 they	
take	 into	account	the	peculiarities	of	 the	French	context	 (the	historical	
development	 of	 laïcité	 in	 the	public	 sphere,	 etc.),	will	 impose	 some	
simplistic	 explanation	on	 the	 issue.	The	concerns	of	 this	 essay	were	
regulated	by	an	awareness	of	 the	dangers	of	 these	 two	 traps.	 If	 the	
author	has	attempted	to	present	the	‘headscarf	problem’	in	all	 its	multi-
layered	plurality,	it	was	with	the	certain	intention	of	avoiding	a	reduction	
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of	 the	 issue	to	a	single	dimension.	The	hijab	as	an	object	and	garment	
both	personal	and	political	is	fascinating	because	it	brings	into	focus	the	
different	structural	and	historical	 trends	 (or	perhaps	the	many	primary	
and	 secondary	 ‘contradictions’	 developing	 in	 disequilibrium)	 in	 the	
transnational	transformation	of	today’s	societies.	
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Note
i		 Other	religions	were	merely	granted	legal	status	and	tolerated.
ii	 Gallicanism	can	be	defined	as	 ‘the	principle	of	 independence	of	 the	Church	of	
France’,	and	is	often	understood	as	the	ideal	that	the	right	of	investiture	should	
rest	with	 the	monarch.	The	Conseil	 d’État	 report	 refers	 to	 ‘administrative	
Gallicanism’	in	the	restored	monarchy.
iii	 This	 holds	 true	despite	 the	 ongoing	dispute	 between	 religious	 groups	 and	
supporters	 of	 laïcité	 	 over	 the	 subject	 of	whether	private	 schools	 should	be	
publicly	funded.	
iv		 On	this	point	there	are	two	important	cases	worth	pointing	out.	(a)	On	enactment	
of	the	Civil	Constitution	of	the	Clergy	(1790),	Pope	Pius	VII	would	only	recognize	
those	 ‘refractory	priests’	who	 remained	 loyal	 to	Rome	and	 refused	 to	 swear	
allegiance	to	the	nation.	(b)	After	the	ballot	on	the	1905	law,	Pope	Pius	X	criticized	
the	unilateral	nature	of	France’s	decision,	which	broke	the	 international	 treaty	
that	was	the	concordat	(Bastid,	1960-61).
v		 “To	make	assertions	 about	principles	 applied	 to	 contexts	differing	 from	 the	
particular	situation	in	which	a	law	was	enacted	is	to	raise	these	principles	from	
the	particular	to	the	general,	from	fact	to	ideal.	With	regard	to	laïcité,	one	of	the	
most	 frequent,	most	 subtle	and	yet	most	 forceful	attacks	 is	 the	attack	which	
denies	 the	values	held	by	 laïcité	 in	 the	 form	of	 these	principles,	 and	which	
attempts	 to	 tie	 laïcité	 to	 the	particular	 set	 of	 circumstances	at	 the	 time	 the	
[1905]	law	was	drafted.	When	such	historicism	comes	from	the	mouths	of	certain	
religious	thinkers	 [possibly	referring	to	scholars	of	 laïcité	such	as	Baubérot	and	
Poulat	-	Onaka]	people	must	surely	be	surprised.	For,	as	religious	thinkers	surely	
they	would	not	apply	such	relativization	to	Jesus’	 injunction	to	 love	 (Sermon	on	
the	Mount).	 Incidentally,	 if	 the	value	 in	 this	 injunction	 to	 love	does	not	derive	
only	from	the	particular	historical	situation	in	which	it	was	born,	but	can	be	seen	
as	deriving	 from	the	meaning	 inherent	 in	 the	 injunction,	 then	 irrespective	of	
what	choices	should	be	made	in	relation	to	faith,	the	same	acceptance	should	also	
be	given	to	the	principle	 that	unites	consideration	 for	ones	 inner	 freedom	with	
consideration	 for	 the	equality	of	all	people.	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	exactly	 the	meaning	
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of	 separation	 through	 laïcité,	 and	many	 thinkers	 from	various	 periods	 and	
considerably	different	standpoints,	 including	those	with	a	religious	perspective	
in	the	true	meaning	of	the	word,	have	indicated	the	necessity	of	this	separation.	
This law is not an agreement	 [that	regards	State	and	Church	as	equal	parties	 -	
Onaka],	it is a unilateral act of liberation based on the sovereignty of the people, and 
by this law the sovereignty of the people acknowledges the justness of that agreement 
in its claim to universality,”	 (Pena-Ruiz,	2004,	pp.35-36;	quoter’s	emphasis).	 	One	
wonders	 if	 this	mode	of	 thought,	which	unhesitatingly	establishes	a	symmetry	
between	the	Christian	injunction	to	love	and	a	Republican	legal	principle,	is	really	
worthy	of	being	called	‘secular	thought’.
vi		 The	report	distinguishes	three	types	of	regime	in	force.	(1)	Protestant	and	Jewish	
Churches.	These	Churches	are	 the	owners	of	 their	own	religious	 facilities,	and	
must	pay	for	the	upkeep	of	these	facilities,	but	are	exempt	from	fixed	asset	tax.	(2)	
Catholic	Church.	Has	right	of	use	of	its	own	religious	buildings,	but	their	upkeep	
must	be	 funded	by	public	bodies.	 (3)	Pastors	and	followers	of	new	religions.	All	
property	is	built	and	managed	in	accordance	with	private	law	and	at	the	expense	
of	those	individuals.	Islam	comes	under	category	(3),	despite	receiving	a	subsidy	of	
500	000	francs	when	the	Great	Mosque	of	Paris	was	built.	The	report	also	urges	
caution	over	“the	quantitative	and	qualitative	poverty	of	mosques	and	places	of	
prayer”	(p.37).
vii		 With	 regard	 to	 the	 application	of	 the	 1905	 law,	 aside	 from	several	 overseas	
départements	 such	as	French	Guiana	being	excluded	 from	the	 law’s	coverage,	
départements	 in	 the	Alsace-Moselle	region	have	remained	under	 the	concordat	
system	(combined	with	German	law	with	regard	to	association)	even	after	being	
restored	to	France	after	WWI.	
viii		According	 to	Hanifa	Chérifi,	 Inspector	General	 of	 the	Education	Ministry,	 in	
the	academic	year	2004-5,	 44	pupils	were	expelled	 form	wearing	 the	Muslim	
headscarf,	while	3	were	expelled	for	wearing	the	Sikh	turban	(Chérifi,	2005).	
ix		 Our	usage	here	of	 the	 term	 ‘Judaeo-Christian’	owes	something	 to	Azria,	 2002,	
though	it	is	used	in	a	free	form.		
x	 The	policies	of	President	Sarkozy	towards	Islam	do	seem	to	be	heading	 in	this	
direction,	the	direction	of	publicly	‘recognizing’	the	Islamic	‘community’	centering	
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on	its	peaceful	elements,	and	then	incorporating	that	community	into	the	system.	
The	task,	the	urgent	task	for	the	future,	is	to	discuss,	in	relation	to	(post)colonialism,	
the	comparison	between	the	system	of	laïcité		based	on	the	1905	law	(which	did	
not	apply	to	Islam	in	the	colonies)	and	the	earlier	system	of	public	recognition	of	
religions	(and	today’s	favored	topics	of	multiculturalism	and	religious	pluralism).	
xi		 The	 first	headscarf	 incident	 in	 this	 controversy	was	 the	 expulsion	 of	 three	
Muslim	schoolgirls	from	Gabriel	Havez	School,	Creil,	Oise.	
xii		 See	Amselle,	2001,	on	the	 lack	of	application	of	 laïcité	 in	Algeria	under	French	
colonial	rule,	and	on	the	colonialist	nature	of	multiculturalism.
xiii	See	Bellil,	2003.
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